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This paper studies whether menu costs are large enough to explain why ￿rms are so
reluctant to change their prices. Without actually estimating menu costs, we can infer
their relevance for ￿rms￿price setting decisions from observed pricing behavior around
a currency changeover. At a currency changeover, ￿rms have to reprint their price
tags (menus) independently of whether or not they want to change prices. And if this
is costly, ￿rms￿price setting behavior is altered in the months around the changeover.
Using data from the Euro-changeover, the paper estimates that menu costs can explain a
stickiness of around 30 days which is considerably less than the 7 to 24-month stickiness
we observe in retailing and in the service sector. The reluctance of ￿rms to adjust prices
more frequently appears to be caused by factors other than menu costs.
Keywords: menu costs, price stickiness
JEL classi￿cation: E30
1 Introduction
At a currency changeover, ￿rms have to reprint their prices independently of whether or not
they want to change prices (menus) and if changing prices is costly, ￿rms will try to make
the changeover coincide with a price change. This behavior will be re￿ ected in the data.
In the run-up to the changeover, ￿rms will postpone price adjustments and, price changes
originally planned for the months after the changeover will be anticipated. The higher the
menu costs, the earlier ￿rms will start postponing. Observing, for example, that an index
is constant for six months before the changeover is a strong indication that menu costs can
explain a stickiness of at least six months. I have to write ￿at least￿because ￿rms might
change prices more frequently in the run-up to the changeover than normal.
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Figure 1: The ￿gure shows German restaurant prices in the four years around the changeover
(denoted by a vertical line). Upper left corner: same data for a longer horizon. Dashed line:
trend in￿ ation from January 1996 until December 2000.
Figure 1 illustrates the point I want to make. The ￿gure shows restaurant prices in
Germany in the years around the changeover. The vertical line denotes the changeover
and, just as we would expect when ￿rms anticipate and postpone, the index jumps at the
changeover. Note, however, that menu costs can explain a jump only up to the extent that the
jump is accompanied by periods of reduced in￿ ation either before or after the changeover.
The question is whether we observe a reduction in in￿ ation. The dashed line indicates
trend in￿ ation in the period from 1996 until December 2000. In the 12 months before the
changeover, in￿ ation appears to be above trend and only in December 2001 do we observe
￿rms postponing. Continuing this, admittedly simplistic, visual inspection and ignoring that
after the changeover there appears to be no sign of ￿rms anticipating, we could argue that
menu costs cause a stickiness of one or two months in the restaurant sector.
On average, restaurants keep prices constant for 12 to 24 months which is typical for most
services. In the retailing sector, price changes are more frequent. Here, the estimates range
from 7 to 11 months. These ￿ndings are quite robust across countries. For the U.S., see
Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) and the earlier study by Bils and Klenow (2004). Alvarez
et al. (2006) and Dhyne et al. (2007) summarize the ￿ndings of a number of country
studies in Europe. The pricing patterns described by this literature often reveal only limited
information about the reason for ￿rms￿reluctance to adjust prices more often. In order to
shed some light on this issue, Levy, Bergen, Dutta and Venable (1997) estimate the magnitude
of menu costs.1 The key insight from this study is that menu costs are large enough to be
1See also Dutta, Bergen, Levy, Venable (1999) and Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007).
2regarded a non-trivial factor in the price-setting decision of ￿rms. The authors estimate that
menu costs make up around 0.7% of revenues of U.S. supermarkets (more than $100,000 per
year per store or $0.50 per price change). Information about the magnitude of menu costs
does, however, not answer the question of whether it is menu costs that cause the stickiness
we observe. In survey studies where business people are asked why they do not adjust prices
more frequently, menu costs usually receive only relatively low support.2
The interesting aspect of the approach taken in this paper is that it reveals directly
whether menu costs hinder ￿rms from changing prices more frequently. Using the individual
series of Eurostat￿ s HICP data for the years around the Euro changeover, the paper estimates
that menu costs can explain a stickiness of around 30 days. The restaurant sector is one of
the few examples where we can observe at least some postponing. In most other industries,
price setting behavior in the months around the changeover appears no di⁄erent to other
periods. Menu costs do not appear to be a relevant factor in ￿rms￿price setting decisions.
Consider, again, ￿gure 1. In the literature, the upward jump in restaurant prices is usually
explained by menu costs. Gaiotti and Lippi (2005), relying on an interesting (annual) data
set, estimate that the changeover caused restaurant prices to increase by 3-4 percentage
points and argue that menu costs provide an explanation for this increase. This is also the
argument of Hobijn, Ravenna and Tambalotti (2006) who use monthly data from Eurostat.
Regarding its size, the jump appears rather large considering that ￿rms postponed only for
a few weeks but, in general, I will argue against using the jump as a sign in favor or against
menu costs. The main problem here is - as argued above - that a jump is not a su¢ cient
signal for menu costs. Information about menu costs is provided by the pricing behavior in
the months around the changeover when ￿rms postpone and anticipate.
The model in this paper is a model of state-dependent pricing based on the classical model
of inventory management which was introduced to the economics profession by Whitin (1953).
In monetary economics, the inventory management model has been used in two di⁄erent
￿elds. (1) Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) apply the model to study money demand by
households and Miller and Orr (1966) study the demand for money by ￿rms. (2) Slightly
modifying and re-interpreting the variables, the model has also been used to study price
setting by ￿rms. The ￿rm￿ s choice variable, rather than being the amount of inventory, is
then interpreted as the ￿rm￿ s price and the ￿rm￿ s objective is to minimize the deviations of its
own price from some ￿optimal￿level taking into account that changing prices is costly. The
2See for example Blinder (1991), Hall (2000) and Apel (2002). Alvarez et al. (2006) and Dhyne et al.
(2007) summarize the survey results of a number of country studies in Europe. For a discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of survey studies see Blinder (1998).
3resulting pricing rules are usually referred to as Ss pricing rules. Important contributions are
Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), Danziger (1983), and Caplin and Spulber (1987).
The model in this paper di⁄ers from other state-dependent pricing models mainly in two
aspects. First, the ￿rm faces a ￿nite horizon problem when calculating the optimal response
to a currency changeover. I am not aware of a paper that studies the inventory management
model or one of its derivations in a ￿nite-horizon set-up. The second modi￿cation is due to
the di⁄erent focus. Rather than studying the optimal size of price adjustments, I am more
interested in the optimal time span between two price adjustments. Technically, the two
problems are equivalent.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present and solve the ￿rm￿ s problem.
Aggregation is achieved by a simulation exercise. The model￿ s predictions are tested in
section 3 and a short discussion in section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The central assumption of the model is that prices are sticky and that the stickiness is caused
by menu costs. The next subsection presents the basic model. Subsection 2.2 shows how a
￿rm alters its price setting during a changeover and a discussion about the model￿ s predictions
and a simulation exercise in subsection 2.3 concludes the theoretical part.
2.1 The Firm￿ s Problem (general)
As in any model with menu costs, we need to assume that ￿rms are price setters. Let P
denote the ￿rm￿ s price and P ￿ the optimal (pro￿t maximizing) price. Without menu costs,
￿rms would set P = P ￿ in every period but when changing prices is costly, ￿rms would keep
prices constant for a while before making a larger adjustment. In order to keep the model
simple, I assume that P ￿ is exogenous and grows at a constant rate ￿￿. Deviations of the
actual from the optimal price are denoted by D = P ￿ P ￿. The menu costs are given by k
and the costs of deviating from the optimal price is denoted by r. Since both k and r are
strictly positive, ￿rms face a trade-o⁄ between paying menu costs and deviating from the
optimal price. A cycle is de￿ned as the time span between two price changes. The optimal
length of a cycle (s) will depend on the relative price k=r. Figure 2 shows how the ￿rm￿ s
price ￿ uctuates around the optimal price. The deviations from the optimal price are shaded.
The ￿rm￿ s problem can be viewed as minimizing the shaded areas under the constraint that




Figure 2: The ￿gure shows how the ￿rm￿ s price (P) ￿ uctuates around the optimal price (P ￿).
The length of a cycle (s) is result of the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem.
The ￿rm minimizes costs. Figure 2 makes clear that the average deviation from the
optimal price equals ￿P
4 . The number of price changes is given by ￿￿
￿P. The ￿rm￿ s problem


















The length of a cycle increases as the menu costs (k) increase, as the costs of deviating (r)
decrease and as in￿ ation (￿￿) decreases.
2.2 The Firm￿ s Problem during a Changeover
Now suppose that there is a currency changeover and assume that the ￿rm has to reprint its
price tag (menu) when the new currency is introduced. In order to save costs, the ￿rm will
try to make the changeover coincide with a price change and it will re-optimize its price-path
as soon as the changeover is announced. This behavior makes the problem of the ￿rm in the
run-up to the changeover that of a ￿nite horizon.
Figure 3 illustrates the ￿rm￿ s problem and de￿nes several new variables. Note that in con-
trast to the previous ￿gure, only deviations (D) from the optimal price are shown. The upper
panel of ￿gure 3 shows the original price-path before the ￿rm learns about the changeover
and re-optimizes its path. Let the initial cycle be the cycle in which the changeover is an-
nounced. The exact moment of the announcement in the initial cycle is indicated by the
parameter ￿ 2 [0;2). When ￿ = 0, the changeover is announced at the very end of the initial
5price path when firm
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Figure 3: Upper panel: original path before ￿rm learns about changeover and adjusts its
path. The changeover is announced in the initial cycle and takes place in the ￿nal cycle.
Middle and lower panel: price path when ￿rm adjusts cycles. The ￿gure is drawn for m = 3;
￿ = 0:9; and ￿ > b ￿ bA.
cycle. The changeover takes place in the ￿nal cycle and the exact moment of the changeover
is indicated by ￿ 2 (0;2]. When ￿ = 2, the changeover takes place at the very end of the
￿nal cycle. Note the reversal of direction with respect to ￿. It is convenient to describe the
￿rm￿ s problem in terms of triangles, rather than cycles. Each cycle consists of two triangles,
one below and one above the horizontal line. Let b = s
2 denote the length of a triangle.
The ￿rm has two options to make the changeover coincide with a price change: postponing
(lengthening the original cycles) or anticipating (shortening the original cycles). Which of
the two possibilities the ￿rm chooses depends on the costs. In case the changeover already
coincides with a planned price change, the ￿rm will not adjust its path. Let bP > b denote the
triangle length in case of postponing and bA < b the triangle length in case of anticipating.
The following observation simpli￿es the presentation of the ￿rm￿ s problem. The decision
whether to postpone or anticipate is (almost) independent of when exactly the changeover is
announced (independent of ￿). For nearly all admissible values of ￿ and ￿ we can, therefore,
assume that the announcement occurs in the center of the initial cycle (where ￿ = 1). The
reason for the quali￿cation is given in the next paragraph.
Suppose that a ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to postpone. Since bP > b, the end of the new cycle
lies outside the initial cycle. The size of bP will, therefore, be independent of ￿ and without
loss of generality we can assume that ￿ = 1. A similar assumption can be made when the
￿rm anticipates but only as long as the announcement does not occur towards the very end
6of the initial cycle. Since bA < b, there is the possibility that the announcement comes ￿too
late￿to choose bA and some other b0
A ￿ bA has to be chosen. In this case, it is optimal to
change prices immediately after the announcement. Most of the time, the ￿rm￿ s decision to
postpone or anticipate is independent of ￿ so I will refer to the case where this is not the
case as the ￿irregular part￿of the initial cycle.3
We need three more variables to study the ￿rm￿ s decision. Let T denote the time span
between announcement and changeover and ￿ T denote the time span between the center of
the initial cycle and the changeover. The variable m denotes the number of triangles between
the center of the initial and the ￿nal cycle. When the ￿rm postpones, there are m triangles
between the center of the initial cycle and the changeover. In case the ￿rm anticipates, there
are m + 2 triangles (see ￿gure 3).









where I used the fact that ￿ T = (m + 2)bA = mbP = mb+￿b. Intuitively, the ￿rm divides the
period between the center of the initial period and the changeover (m + ￿) equally among
the triangles. In case the ￿rm anticipates, there are m + 2 triangles, and when the ￿rm
postpones, there are m triangles. The relationship between b
0




m ￿ 1 + ￿ + ￿
m + 1
: (5)
Unlike bA or bP, the length of b
0
A depends on the exact moment of the announcement (on ￿).
In this case, the number of triangles whose lengths the ￿rm can optimize is m + 1. More
information about how equation (5) is derived is given in the appendix.
We can now turn to the decision problem of the ￿rm.4 When deciding whether to postpone
or anticipate, the ￿rm needs to take into account (a) that there are less price changes when
postponing (less menu costs to be paid) and (b) that on average, it will deviate more from
3Assuming, for example, that the changeover takes place ￿ve years after its announcement and that ￿rms




4Here I only sketch the decision when the announcement happens during the regular part of the initial
cycle. Details can be found in the appendix. The calculations for the irregular part are similar and presented
in the appendix as well.
7the optimal price when postponing. The costs are given by








where CA (CP) are the costs when anticipating (postponing). The costs include the costs
of deviating from the optimal price (￿rst term) plus the menu costs (second term). The costs
of deviating from the optimal price is given by r times the number of triangles (m or m+2)
times the area of the triangles (FP or FA). FA (FP) has length bA (bP) and height given by
the in￿ ation rate. In general, when ￿ is small, the ￿rm will postpone and when ￿ is large
it will anticipate. This seems intuitive. The optimal length of a cycle would be b, but when
b does not allow the changeover to coincide with a price change, some other triangle length
has to be chosen. For a small ￿, the new triangle length bP is still close to b and will be
preferred. For a large ￿, bA and b are similar and when ￿ = 2, bA and b are equal.
Interestingly, the ￿rm is not indi⁄erent between anticipating and postponing when ￿ = 1,
but somewhat to the left of the center. The indi⁄erence point (￿i) can be found by setting
CA = CP and is given by
￿i =
p
m(m + 2) ￿ m: (6)
Note that ￿i ￿ 1 and that limm!1 ￿i = 1. An intuition why ￿i ￿ 1 is that the costs of
deviating from the optimal price (the area given by FA and FP) are convex in bA and bP.
Increasing bP by one unit increases the costs by more than what is reduced by decreasing
bA by one unit. In this sense, postponing is ￿punished￿more than anticipating. Note that
￿gure 3 was drawn such that the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between postponing and anticipating.
With m = 3 as in the ￿gure, ￿i ’ 0:9.











￿ m(2 ￿ ￿): (7)







and that for all ￿, ￿i ￿ ￿irr
i ￿ 1.
The following decision tree summarizes the ￿ndings.
1. Before the changeover, the ￿rm chooses s (or b) optimally, given the in￿ ation rate (￿￿)
and the two types of costs k and r.
8announcement currency changeover





The Effect of a Currency Changeover on Prices
Figure 4: The ￿gure shows three simulated price paths. The announcement and the
changeover are denoted by vertical lines. See text for more information.
2. When the changeover is announced, the ￿rm learns ￿ and T.
3. Knowing this, the ￿rm can calculate ￿, m and ￿ T.
4. The decision whether to postpone or to anticipate is then given by equations (6) and
(7) and the size of the new cycles can be calculated using (3), (4), and (5).
2.3 Discussion
In this section I discuss the model￿ s predictions and present a simulation exercise. Using the
steps outlined in the previous section, we can simulate the price path of an individual ￿rm.
An aggregate of many ￿rms can be generated by averaging over a number of individual price
paths.
Figure 4 shows three examples of such paths. For the individual ￿rm, I assumed that
its original cycle length is 12 months (s = 12). Re-optimizing after the announcement, the
￿rm in this example chooses to anticipate so that the cycles between announcement and
changeover are somewhat shorter than 12 months. As intended, the ￿rm starts a new cycle
at the changeover whose length is again 12 months.
The second path (aggregate) shows the average price level of 365 ￿rms. The ￿rms are
identical (s = 12), but their cycles are shifted. The ￿rst ￿rm￿ s cycle starts on the ￿rst day of
the year, the second ￿rm￿ s cycle on the second and so on. These shifts have two e⁄ects. First,
they make the aggregate increase smoothly during the ￿rst years and second, all ￿rms will be
at a di⁄erent stage of their cycle when the changeover is announced. Each ￿rm will, therefore,
react di⁄erently; some will anticipate, others postpone, all with the objective of making the
changeover coincide with the beginning of a cycle. Because of this re-optimization, we observe
9the characteristic pattern discussed before, a discrete jump and constant prices before and
after the changeover. By re-optimizing, the ￿rms synchronized their price setting after the
changeover so that the aggregate increases stepwise like the individual path.
This synchronization is a strong prediction and we only observe it because all ￿rms are
identical. The third path (aggregate, heterogeneous), is an aggregate of ￿rms with di⁄erent
s. For the ￿rst twelfth, I set s = 12, for the second s = 13, and so on until s = 24. Within
each group, the cycles are shifted as in the previous example. Again, we observe constant
prices before and after the changeover and the characteristic jump. This time, however, the
synchronization fades out soon after the changeover.
Another interesting prediction of the model is that menu costs have a relatively short
e⁄ect on the level of prices. Even though the level jumps signi￿cantly at the changeover, it
returns to its pre-changeover trend after only about half a cycle (s=2). After a full cycle, the
level is predicted to be below its pre-changeover trend.
Figure 4 nicely illustrates the hypothesis of this paper, that ￿rms￿price setting behavior
around the changeover reveals information about the ￿relevance￿of menu costs. The higher
the menu costs, the longer ￿rms will postpone and anticipate. Turning the argument around,
not observing ￿rms postponing or anticipating is a strong sign that menu costs are only of
minor concern to ￿rms.
Recall that observing that an index is constant for 12 months before the changeover
implies a stickiness of more than 12 months. This is because there are ￿rms that anticipate,
that is, their cycles are shorter than they would normally be. The model allows us to calculate
the bias introduced by this change in behavior. Since b
0
A < bA < b < bP, the shortest cycles
are the cycles of ￿rms that anticipate immediately after the announcement. The relationship
between the observed s0
A and s, the variable we are interested in is given by equation (5). The
number of triangles (m) can be calculated from the time span between announcement and
changeover and the values of ￿ and ￿ that maximize the wedge between s0
A and s are ￿ = 0
and ￿ = ￿i (for smaller values of ￿, the ￿rm would postpone). Returning to the example
above, observing that s0
A = 12 implies that s is nearly 15 months. For the period after the
changeover, no such adjustment needs to be made.
103 Estimating the Relevance of Menu Costs
Before discussing how I test for the model￿ s predictions I need to discuss one important
assumption of the model: that ￿rms change price tags at the changeover. I will then present
the data and address several characteristics of the data that are important for the analysis.
Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 test the menu cost hypothesis and a short summary concludes.
An important assumption of the model is that ￿rms change price-tags (menus) at the
changeover. This is, however, not necessarily the case in practice because of the possibility
to ￿dual price￿ . Dual pricing means that a ￿rm denotes the price of an item in both the
new and the old currency. Dual pricing allows ￿rms to switch from one currency regime to
another at a moment other than the changeover, violating the assumption. Using data from
Germany allows us to get around this problem. In Germany, prices had to be denoted in the
old currency until the changeover and dual pricing was optional. From the changeover on,
prices had to be denoted in the new currency and dual pricing was again optional but only
until the end of February 2002. From then on, dual pricing was not permitted. This means
that in Germany all price tags had to be replaced within the eight weeks from January 1st
until February 28th 2002. I will argue, however, that most price tags were replaced already in
the days after the changeover. There is no direct evidence for this behavior but the impact of
the changeover on relative prices provides some hints. As ￿gure 1 illustrates, the changeover
a⁄ected relative prices in some sectors (both retailing and services) and the impact appears
to have occurred almost entirely between December and January. Neither in February nor
March 2002 there does appear to be a noticeable impact.5 Also in the estimations below,
it is January 2002 where we notice an impact from the changeover and neither February
nor March are conspicuous; providing some support for the claim. But again, there is no
information about the exact share of price tags that were replaced at the changeover, so that
this ultimately remains an assumption.
For the data analysis, I am using the individual series of Eurostat￿ s HICP basket. The
basket contains monthly observations of 83 indices. The data start in January 1996 and end
in December 2007.6 Unfortunately, only quality-adjusted data are available for Germany.
This is a potential drawback as the quality-adjusted data might not re￿ ect underlying price
movements and possibly introduce a bias in the estimates. In principle, the bias introduced
can go both in favor and against the point I want to make. Consider again the example
of restaurant prices in ￿gure 1. In the month before the changeover, the index is constant
5For detailed description how the changeover a⁄ected relative prices see Buchwald et al. (2002). Bundes-
bank (2004) and Ho⁄mann and Kurz-Kim (2006).
6The Euro changeover was announced in October 1997 and took place in January 2002.
11and I argued that this could be explained by menu costs. The constancy of the index
might, however, only be an artifact of the quality-adjusted data. It could be that the ￿true￿
data increased or decreased and only the judgment of the statistical o¢ ce about quality
adjustments made the index constant. The opposite might occur as well; that the ￿true￿
data are constant and only after adjusting for quality, movements in prices are added.
Fortunately, there is more information available about the bias and I will argue that the
bias is small and more importantly, that the bias appears to work against the point I want
to make. Ho⁄mann and Kurz-Kim (2006) estimate that the average HICP in￿ ation of 1.2
percent over the period 1997 until 2003 would have been 1.5 percent had the statistical o¢ ce
not adjusted for quality. On average, the quality adjusted data exhibit a lower in￿ ation than
the ￿true￿data which introduces a bias in favor of the menu costs hypothesis. This bias
seems small, however. A bias of 0.3 percentage points per year amounts to a bias of less than
0.03 percentage points per month. For industrial goods, the bias is larger. In the industrial
goods sector, Ho⁄mann and Kurz-Kim (2006) estimate a bias of 0:9 percent per year which
amounts to 0:075 percentage points per month.
This takes me to a second characteristic of the data. Unlike in other countries, the German
data are published with only one decimal place. The average absolute size of the indices at
the time of the changeover is about 100 points and for many series an increase or decrease of
0:1 percent per month is fairly large. This means that there might be considerable movement
in the underlying ￿true￿data which is not re￿ ected in the index. This characteristic is a
potential source of bias in favor of the menu cost hypothesis and will be important when I
study whether the indices are constant around the changeover in the next subsection.
An interesting feature of the HICP basket is that most consumer goods are sold at ￿pricing
points￿ , or threshold prices such as 1:99 or 24:90. Depending on how one de￿nes pricing
points, the estimates range from 72 to 95 percent of the data (Holdershaw et al. 1997,
Fengler and Winter 2001, Bergen et al. 2003). This and the fact that the exchange rate





means that ￿rms not only needed to reprint
new price tags but also needed to decide whether to round to a new pricing point. In the
literature, the costs of the decision making process are often referred to as ￿managerial costs￿ .
What makes this feature interesting for the exercise in this paper is that the menu costs we
estimate not only include the costs of printing new price tags but are likely to include the
managerial costs as well.
Two issues arise when using aggregate data, the ￿rst might be called ￿causality￿and the
second concerns the heterogeneity of ￿rms. Studying aggregate data and deducing charac-
teristics of the underlying individual series might appear problematic and in fact, causality
12clearly goes from the individual ￿rms to the aggregate. If the individual ￿rms keep their
prices constant, the aggregate will be constant as well but the converse does not hold as
there might be some ￿rms that increased and others that decreased leaving the average un-
changed. What we need in this exercise is, however, something like the ￿contrapositive￿ . Not
observing that the aggregate is constant implies that there are ￿rms that adjusted prices and
this observation is what is required for the exercise of this paper.
A di⁄erent problem arises when the ￿rms aggregated in one index are heterogeneous. It
would skew the results if, for example, half the restaurants in ￿gure 1 had menu costs so
high, that it forced them to keep prices constant for 24 months and the other half menu costs
so low that they can adjust every week. In this case, we would not observe a constant index
as presumed above but we would observe a reduced in￿ ation. This is, however, a testable
implication as well.
The model￿ s predictions are clear. In the months before and after the changeover, ￿rms
should keep prices constant when menu costs play a relevant role in their price setting. In
addition, if the index has a non-zero trend, we should also observe a jump of the index at
the changeover. When taking these predictions to the data, I will make three simpli￿ca-
tions, all three due to practical reasons, though I should mention that the simpli￿cations are
￿conservative￿in the sense that they tend to favor the menu cost hypothesis.
First, I will ignore whether an index has a trend. An index without trend might be
constant before and after the changeover but no information is revealed about menu costs.
Ignoring the trend means that certain patterns in the data are (incorrectly) attributed to
menu costs. The reason for this simpli￿cation is that it is often di¢ cult to decide whether a
series has a trend. This di¢ culty arises mainly because the answer to this question depends
on the period under consideration and a priori it is not clear, for example, whether a series
should exhibit a trend in the months around the changeover or over the whole sample period.
Second, I will ignore the jump and focus only on the periods before and after the
changeover. In principle, the size of the jump could give information about menu costs
as well, but several di¢ culties arise in practice. As mentioned above, it is often not clear
whether a series has a trend or even whether the trend is positive or negative which makes it is
di¢ cult to decide whether one should expect an index to jump up or down at the changeover.
There are a number of apparently downward trending indices that jumped up when the new
currency was introduced. Another di¢ culty is caused by ￿rms￿quest for attractive prices.
The tendency to price at pricing points forces ￿rms to round up or down at the changeover
so that the size of the jump we observe does not necessarily re￿ ect menu cost considerations.
Third, according to the model, we should expect an index to be constant both before and
after the changeover. In the test below, I will consider it as a sign in favor of the menu cost

























Table 1: The table displays the number of series in the basket (out of a total of 83) with no
price change immediately before or after the changeover for the number of months given in
the left column. Bootstrapped probabilities are shown in brackets. The probability is 1 if
not otherwise indicated. "First" ("second") refers to the part of the sample up to (starting
with) the changeover.
hypothesis if an index is constant before or after the changeover.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We can get a ￿rst impression about the relevance of menu costs by studying how many
constant indices there are before and after the changeover.
Table 1 shows that 34 (28) of the 83 series are constant for one month before (after)
the changeover. There are 18 (14) that are constant in the two consecutive months before
(after) the changeover. Compared to the size of the basket, these numbers are not very high.
Given the low in￿ ation in Germany during our sample period, it is not unusual to observe
constant indices so it would be interesting to see how likely it is to observe, say, 34 indices
to be constant in a particular month.
Figure 5 shows that the answer to this question depends on whether we take the years
before or the years after the changeover as reference. From the beginning of the sample in
1996 until about 2000 it appears quite usual that more than a third of the indices remains
constant from one month to the other. Towards the end of the sample the pictures changes.
I do not have an explanation for the downward trend in the ￿gure though my impression is
that it is unrelated to the changeover.
For a more formal analysis regarding the likelihood to observe an index to be constant,
14Dec. 2001 (34)
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Figure 5: The ￿gure shows the number of indices in the basket (out of a total of 83) whose
level remains constant in a particular month. The changeover and two VAT increases are
denoted by vertical lines.
I estimate the probability of such an event by bootstrapping methods. Table 1 shows the
results.7 As ￿gure 5 already suggested, compared to the years before the changeover (￿rst
part of the sample) it is likely to observe 34 constant indices in a particular month. Looking at
the whole sample and especially at the years after the changeover (second part of the sample)
the estimated probabilities are rather low. Regarding the month after the changeover, table
1 shows that observing 28 constant indices as we do in the month after the changeover is not
unusual in any of the subsamples. Table 1 also shows that a similar picture arises when we
look at the number of series that are constant for two consecutive months.
To sum up, if we only consider the months after the changeover, no signs of menu costs
appear. Considering the months before, there are some signs. However, the e⁄ect of menu
costs on ￿rms￿price setting does not appear compellingly strong. In more than half of the
sectors, ￿rms do not appear to be very keen to postpone and only few ￿rms postpone for
more than two months.
The approach in this section is very basic, but it allows us to calculate an average ￿stick-
iness that can be explained by menu costs￿ . The procedure is best explained by an example.
Consider again the restaurant prices in ￿gure 1 that are constant for one month before the
changeover. Two factors have to be taken into account. First, the data are collected at
7The probabilities in table 1 are calculated by randomly resampling the observations and calculating for
each draw a 90% con￿dence interval. Repeating this 1000 times and counting how often the number of interest
falls within the two bounds gives the probability. Since I rely on the empirical and not on any theoretical
distribution, extreme probabilities such as 0 or 1 are not unusual. These should not be taken literally.
15around mid-month so that we have to add 15 days to the 31 days observed.8 Second, the
model in the previous section showed that there are ￿rms whose cycle in the run-up to the
changeover is shorter than otherwise. Using the method outlined in section 2.3 to compen-
sate for this behavior, we ￿nd that menu costs can explain a stickiness in restaurant prices
of around 50 days. Doing this for all sectors and weighing each sector by its weight in the
basket gives a stickiness of 34:1 days that can be explained by menu costs. Looking at the
period after the changeover, the stickiness is somewhat lower with around 33:5 days.
This is, admittedly, a rather crude measure but it nicely illustrates the main ￿ndings so
far. There are some signs of menu costs in the data but these seem to be quite small. In the
next section, where I pursue a more elaborate estimation procedure, the evidence in favor of
the menu costs hypothesis is even weaker.
3.2 Regression Analysis
The idea of the approach taken in this section is, using a regression analysis, to predict in-
￿ ation in the months around the changeover and to use this prediction to test whether ￿rms
postponed or anticipated. Compared to the approach taken in the previous section, a regres-
sion analysis has two advantages. First, it allows us to test whether in￿ ation in the months
around the changeover was reduced. As discussed above, when the ￿rms aggregated in one
index are heterogeneous, we might not observe a constant index as presumed before but we
would observe a reduced in￿ ation. A regression analysis allows us to test for this implication.
The second advantage is that a regression analysis allows us to control for seasonalities and
other regularities overlooked in the previous subsection. Consider the following model
￿t = Xt￿ + D￿ + "t; (8)
where ￿t is monthly in￿ ation of a price index and Xt is a matrix of variables to be speci￿ed
below. The variable D is a period-speci￿c dummy that takes on the value one for a speci￿c
period and zero for all other observations. The coe¢ cient estimate for this dummy (￿) is the
forecast error for that period, and the estimated variance of the coe¢ cient estimate is the
estimate of the variance of the forecast error. Let a denote the actual value of in￿ ation in
the period under consideration and p = a ￿ ￿ its predicted value. Observing that
jaj < jpj
can be interpreted as a sign that ￿rms postponed or anticipated. We have to take absolute
8Here I assume that the 31 days were caused by menu costs, ignoring that it is not unusual to observe a
constant price level in this sector in other months.
16Predicted Versus Actual In￿ ation
Jan. - Nov. 2001 Oct. 2001 Nov. 2001 Dec. 2001
jaj > jpj 61 47 41 33
(signi￿cant) (15) (36) (31) (19)
jaj ￿ jpj 22 36 42 50
(signi￿cant) (2) (17) (22) (22)
Feb. - Dec. 2002 Feb. 2002 Mar. 2002 Apr. 2002
jaj > jpj 42 48 43 53
(signi￿cant) (9) (24) (19) (23)
jaj ￿ jpj 41 35 40 30
(signi￿cant) (7) (22) (26) (25)
Table 2: The table reports the number of regressions in which the model￿ s prediction (p)
over- or underestimates the actual value (a) of in￿ ation. Signi￿cance based on Newey-West
standard errors.
values because some indices are downward trending.9
I use the same model for all 83 price indices. This comes at the expense that the model
might not be optimal for all sectors but the approach is more transparent and has the
advantage that the results are easily replicated. Concerning the speci￿cation, I started with
a general model and reduced the number of lags using the standard information criteria and
scrutinizing the residuals. The goal was to ￿nd a speci￿cation that provides a reasonable ￿t
for a number of di⁄erent indices and extend it to the whole basket. In the baseline model,
I assume that in￿ ation follows an autoregressive process with lags 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12. The
matrix Xt also includes a constant and three dummies; one for the changeover and two for the
two VAT changes in April 1998 and January 2007. Table 4 in the appendix shows regression
results for a model with seasonal dummies and without the twelfth lag. The results are
similar but slightly favor the point I want to make. Two indices had to be dropped from the
model with seasonal dummies because of multicollinearity.
I am interested in how many of the 83 series in the basket overestimate and how many
underestimate actual in￿ ation in the months around the changeover. On average we should
expect the model to overestimate the actual value in about half of the months. Deviations
from this is a sign that some factor external to the model (e.g. menu costs) a⁄ected ￿rms￿
price setting.
9The case where sign(a) 6= sign(p) barely occurs in practice.
17Table 2 reports the regression results. First consider December 2001 in the upper right
column of table 2. In 50 out of the 83 indices, the model overestimates actual in￿ ation
(jaj ￿ jpj). This can be read as a sign that ￿rms have postponed price adjustments until the
changeover. These 50 indices include the 34 from the previous subsection that kept prices
constant (see table 1). Interestingly, nearly a quarter of the indices in the basket (19 out of
83) show a signi￿cantly higher in￿ ation than the model predicts.
In November and October 2001, the reduction we observed in December seems absent.
Interestingly, looking at the year before the changeover (ignoring December), the model
suggests that in nearly three quarters of the series (61 out of 83), in￿ ation is unexpectedly
high. With the exception of December 2001, one month before the changeover, the postponing
we would expect when menu costs are a relevant factor for ￿rms seems to be absent. In the
model with seasonal dummies (shown in table 4 in the appendix) there is even less evidence
in favor of menu costs. With seasonal dummies, the indication that ￿rms postponed in
December disappears.
A similar picture arises in the months after the changeover where we should see ￿rms
anticipating which, again, causes the model to overestimate actual in￿ ation (jaj ￿ jpj). For
February 2002 one could argue that rather than an anticipation we observe the opposite.
But the numbers are not that convincing so that, on the whole, the model neither over- nor
underestimates actual in￿ ation in the months after the changeover.
Before concluding this section, I present a di⁄erent way to analyze whether ￿rms altered
their price-setting behavior in the months around the changeover. The test is as well based on
a regression but rather than studying the signs of dummy variables, I analyze the residuals of
these regressions. I ￿rst re-run the 83 regressions dropping D from equation (8) and collecting
the residuals in a matrix ￿ (with size 83￿131). Each row of ￿ contains the residuals of one
of the 83 price indices. In order to make the residuals of the various regressions comparable, I
standardize ￿ by dividing each row by its standard deviations so that all rows have mean zero
and standard deviation of 1. For illustrative purposes, I am also interested in the January
residuals (January 2002 and others years). These are generated by dropping both D and the
changeover dummy from the model (equation 8).
Figure 6 illustrates the test. The upper panel of ￿gure 6 shows the kernel density of the
residuals in January 2002 (dashed line) and the kernel density of a ￿typical￿January, which
consists of the combined residuals of all Januaries in the sample except 2002 and 2007 (VAT
change). At the changeover, many prices increased which causes the prominent right-shift of
the density.
The idea of the test is the following. Most indices have an upward trend so that we
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Figure 6: Kernel densities of the residuals. "Typical" refers to the residuals in the same
period in other years. *First quarter is the ￿rst quarter after the changeover (February,
March, April).
or anticipate. The residual densities should, therefore di⁄er from what we ￿typically￿observe
in other years. Let f (x) denote the probability density function of the residuals in the period
of interest and g (x) the ￿typical￿residuals from the same period in other years. Then the
null hypothesis we wish to test is
H0 : f (x) = g (x).
A convenient distance measure between two distributions f (x) and g (x) is their integrated
square di⁄erence given by
J =
Z
[f (x) ￿ g (x)]
2 dx:
Note that J = 0 under H0, and J > 0 if H0 is false. I follow Li (1996) who proposes a
test statistic based on J where f (x) and g (x) are replaced by kernel estimators as shown in
￿gure 6.
Table 3 reports the test results.10 For January 2002, the null hypothesis is clearly rejected.
For all other months around the changeover, we cannot reject that the two sets of residuals
come from the same underlying distribution. The lower two panels of ￿gure 6 show the kernel
densities for the two quarters before and after the changeover. In the fourth quarter 2002,
10The p￿values are bootstrapped; more information is given in the appendix.
19Testing Equality of Distributions
H0 : f (x) = g (x)
period Nov. 2001 Dec. 2001 Jan. 2002 Feb. 2002 Mar.2002
p￿value 0:14 0:18 0:00 0:92 0:46
period Fourth Quarter 2001 First Quarter* 2002
p￿value 0:98 0:47
Table 3: The test is whether the residuals in period x di⁄er from the "typical" residuals in
period x in other years. The p-value is the probability that accepting H0 is wrong. *First
Quarter is the ￿rst quarter after the changeover (February, March, April).
the residuals shift slightly to the right and in the ￿rst quarter the residuals shift slightly left.
In both cases, the shift is not strong enough to allow for a rejection of the null. The kernel
densities for the two months immediately before and after the changeover (December 2001
and February 2002) look similar. December shows a slight shift to the right and February a
slight shift to the left. Again, in both cases the shift is not large enough to reject the null.
According to this test, no signi￿cant evidence appears in the data that ￿rms altered their
price setting around the changeover.
3.3 Summary
Overall, it is di¢ cult to ￿nd convincing evidence that ￿rms postponed or anticipated. There
are signs that in the month immediately before the changeover some ￿rms postponed, but
these ￿ndings are not robust to di⁄erent testing methods and quantitatively the e⁄ect is
small. Regarding the type of sectors where we observe ￿rms postponing, no real pattern
emerges. Services ￿rms, such as restaurants, seem to be somewhat more prone to postponing
than others but the e⁄ect is minimal.
The ￿ndings are in line with Ho⁄mann and Kurz-Kim (2006) who, using micro data from
the German CPI basket, do not ￿nd evidence of ￿rms postponing or anticipating in the six
months before and after the changeover. The same ￿ndings have been con￿rmed for other
Euro-countries (Baudry et al. 2004 and Jonker et al. 2004). Another interesting study
is Bundesbank (2004). The authors of this study analyze for a number of selected items
(including restaurants) the evolution of major cost components (producer prices, wages,
rents, and other input prices). The development of these cost components was stable in the
months around the changeover so that the accellerated in￿ ation we observed in 2001 in the
restaurant sector, for example, appears not to be driven by supply-side factors. The authors
argue that two years after the changeover, restaurant prices (among others) are above their
pre-changeover price trend; something already suggested by ￿gure 1.
204 Conclusion
This paper measures the ￿relevance￿of menu costs by studying ￿rms￿price-setting behavior
around a currency changeover. At a changeover, ￿rms have to reprint their price tags (menus)
and if this is costly, ￿rms will try to make the changeover coincide with a price change. In the
run-up to the changeover, ￿rms will postpone price adjustments and price changes originally
planned for the months after the changeover will be anticipated.
Using data from the Euro-changeover in January 2002, the paper estimates that menu
costs can explain a stickiness of around 30 days which is considerably less than the 7 to
24￿month stickiness we observe in retailing and in the services sector. As argued, this
estimate is based on relatively basic, though mostly conservative, assumptions but it nicely
illustrates that ￿rms do not seem to care much about paying menu costs. It is di¢ cult to
￿nd evidence of ￿rms postponing or anticipating in the months around the changeover.
Though not directly the subject of this paper, the analysis raises the question of what
caused the pointed increase in restaurant prices. In quite a large number of sectors, prices
increased when Euro coins and banknotes were introduced. In the case of restaurant and
some other services prices, it appears that these have stabilized at a higher level. A fairly
large number of studies describe the price movements but only few attempts have been made
to discuss this phenomenon from a theoretical side. It is also worth mentioning that the
changeover a⁄ected relative prices in only about half of the countries that adopted the new
currency.
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24A Appendix
A.1 Details to Section 2
This appendix describes in detail the decision problem of the ￿rm. For convenience, the
variables of the model are repeated here.
￿ P : actual price, set by the ￿rm
￿ P ￿ : optimal price (assumed to increase over time at a constant rate ￿￿ > 0)
￿ k : menu costs (independent of size of price change)
￿ r : costs of deviating from optimal price
￿ s : length of a cycle
￿ b : length of a triangle (2b = s)
￿bA (bP): length of a triangle when the ￿rm anticipates (postpones)
￿ m : number of triangles
￿ ￿ 2 [0;2) indicates exact position of the announcement in the initial cycle
￿ ￿ 2 (0;2] indicates exact position of the changeover in the ￿nal cycle
￿ T : time span from announcement to changeover.
￿ ￿ T : time span from center of initial cycle to changeover
￿ FA (FP) : area of a triangle when the ￿rm anticipates (postpones)
Describing the ￿rm￿ s problem simpli￿es if we use trigonometric functions. Let ￿ denote
the angle described by the slope of P ￿, that is, by the in￿ ation rate ￿￿. When in￿ ation is
zero, ￿ = 0. Using this, we can derive an equilibrium condition linking the menu costs to







25Following the de￿nition of a cycle, there is exactly one price change within a cycle which





Graphically, the menu costs (k) are proportional to the two triangles of an (optimally chosen)
cycle. Rewriting this using ￿ we get that
k = rtan￿ ￿ b
2:
A.2 The Decision Problem of the Firm
A.2.1 Regular Part
Whether the ￿rm postpones or anticipates depends on the costs.
￿ CA: costs when anticipating when announcement occurs in the regular part of the
initial period.
￿ CP: costs when postponing when announcement occurs in the regular part of the initial
period.
The ￿rm is indi⁄erent when CA = CP. Without loss of generality, CA and CP are
calculated as if the announcement was at the center of the initial cycle. (The additional
terms that arise in the more general case would cancel when we compare CA and CP). Also
note that the menu costs that need to be paid at the changeover are not counted. This is
just a convention without any e⁄ect on the ￿nal result. The additional terms would cancel
when we compare CA and CP.






















































Substituting bA = bm+￿
m+2 and bp = bm+￿












Setting both sides equal, re-arranging and solving for ￿ gives equation (6) in the text.
￿i =
p
m(m + 2) ￿ m
A.2.2 Irregular Part
￿ C0
A: costs when anticipating, when the announcement occurs at the end of the initial
cycle (the irregular period).
￿ C0
P: costs when postponing, when the announcement occurs at the end of the initial
cycle (the irregular period).
C
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r ￿ area of triangle in































m+1 and bp = bm+￿












Figure 7: The ￿gure shows the ￿rm￿ s optimal choice for all possible combinations of ￿ and
￿. For low (high) values of ￿ a ￿rm will postpone (anticipate). The area below the dashed
line is the ￿irregular￿part. If a ￿rm ￿nds it optimal to anticipate in the irregular part it











+ (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + 2:











￿ m(2 ￿ ￿):
The relationship between b0
A and b above was derived using the fact that
T = (m + 1)b
0
A
T = (m ￿ 1)b + ￿b + ￿b:
A.2.3 Graphical Presentation
There is a nice graphical illustration of the decision problem of the ￿rm. For a given m, the
parameters ￿ and ￿ are su¢ cient to describe the problem. Figure 7 summarizes the ￿ndings.
28Predicted Versus Actual In￿ ation
Jan. - Nov. 2001 Oct. 2001 Nov. 2001 Dec. 2001
jaj > jpj 58 46 36 40
(signi￿cant) (14) (28) (24) (20)
jaj ￿ jpj 23 35 45 41
(signi￿cant) (2) (13) (15) (14)
Feb. - Dec. 2002 Feb. 2002 Mar. 2002 Apr. 2002
jaj > jpj 40 51 50 50
(signi￿cant) (5) (15) (9) (18)
jaj ￿ jpj 41 30 31 31
(signi￿cant) (4) (17) (14) (15)
Table 4: The table reports the number of regressions in which the model￿ s prediction (p)
over- or underestimates the actual value (a) of in￿ ation. Signi￿cance based on Newey West
standard errors. Model: baseline without lag(12) and 11 seasonal dummies. 2 series had to
be dropped due to multicollinearity.
For small ￿ (changeover occurs shortly after an originally planned price change), it is always
optimal to postpone. For large ￿, it is always optimal to anticipate. The boundary where
the ￿rm is indi⁄erent is constant and equal to ￿i for large values of ￿. For small values of ￿
(smaller than 2￿￿
m+2), the boundary varies with ￿. The area below ￿ < 2￿￿
m+2 (the dashed line
in the ￿gure), is the irregular part. The ￿gure is drawn for m = 1 for illustrative purposes.
For larger m, the irregular part is smaller.
A.3 Testing the Equality of two Distributions
The test is based on Li (1996), see also Li and Racine (2007). The test is asymptotically
normal distributed,
Tn (J)
d ! N (0;1)
but a small-sample bias has been reported, so I follow Mammen (1992) who suggests using
bootstrapping methods to better approximate the null distribution of the test statistic. This





i=1 be the two sets of residuals and assume that X has a PDF f (￿) and Y has a
PDF g (￿). Since under the null hypothesis both f and g are drawn from the same underlying
distribution, we can pool them. Letting Zi denote the ith sample realization for the pooled
data, I randomly draw n1 observations from fZig
n1+n2










i=1. The test statistic T ￿
n is computed in the same way as Tn (J) except with Xi
and Yi being replaced by X￿
i and Y ￿
i , respectively. This procedure is repeated 1000 times.
The reported p-value is the percentage of the 1000 bootstrapped T ￿
ns above Tn (J).
30